On deep diversity in religious traditions: An alternative to John Hick’s surface-level “pluralism”.

Lately in many quarters the term “pluralism” applied to the interpretation of religions has become mainly associated with the view in which the apparent pluralism of religions lies only on the surface.  At a deeper level, this pluralism disappears, because there is after all only one truth taught by all religions.  John Hick is the author most often named as a proponent of this view.

But this is really only a superficial kind of pluralism.  I argue for a much more fundamental and radical pluralism.  On this view, apparent differences in religious beliefs “go all the way down” so to speak. There is no deeper level in which they all converge on a single truth.

What kinds of truths do religions claim to teach?

This much more radical pluralism is connected to a view about the particular kind of truth which religions claim to teach. 

In traditional times, when mythological thinking was prevalent, many religious writings seemed to assert truths about the literal existence of entities and events assumed to exist in an unseen supernatural world.  More recently, the term “metaphysics” has sometimes been used to describe the kinds of truths which religions teach. 

But most of these modern accounts assume that there exists a realm of objective truths that are beyond the reach of empirical science or empirical philosophy.  And if these truths are fully objective, they must also be universal, valid for all people in all cultures throughout all time.  The concern to uphold the existence of such objective and universal truths seems to underlie the concern to posit some single level of deep truth about unseen levels of reality, that underlies the apparent and superficial diversity of religious beliefs.

The much more radical pluralism that I advocate begins with a different view of the kinds of truths that religions have a valid claim to teach.  The main purpose of religious writings is to give us guides to how we ought to live our lives.  The main truths they claim to teach can thus be described as truths lying in the “ethical” realm, if we define “ethics” in the broad sense proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who said that enquiry in “Ethics” can be defined as “enquiry into what is valuable, into what is really important… into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.  In terms suggested by theologian Paul Tillich, religions claim to teach us what ought to be of “ultimate concern,” “what finally matters” in life.  “Axiological” is another term sometimes used to define this realm in the broadest way.

To relate this to our present topic, the main thing that religions claim to be teaching us is what we ought to take as the Supreme Good in human life.  And my proposal is that the fundamental differences between different religious traditions lie in the fact that what some religions teach as the Supreme Good in human life is very fundamentally different from what others advocate taking as the Supreme Good.  For example, early Buddhism proposes that Nirvana is the Supreme Good in human life, involving the immensely difficult task of completely eliminating Craving and Attachment, for which meditation exercises are proposed.  In his New Testament Letter to the Romans, Paul assumes that the Supreme Good in life, what finally matters, is achieving a level of true moral Rightness which cannot be achieved by any such exercises or other kinds of ordinary human efforts, and which has nothing to do with the elimination of Craving and Attachment.

The relevance of Platonism

Ultimately, these proposals are grounded in a pluralist Platonism, centered on a Platonist theory of centered on world-transcending virtue-ideals (the central topic of mybook Rational Spirituality and Divine Virtue in Plato).  “Virtue” translates Plato’s arētē, better translated by the broader concept of human “excellence”.  Under this broader definition, both Buddhist Nirvana and Pauline divinely given Rightness should be considered as world-transcending excellence-ideals.  They are just different world-transcending excellence ideals.

On “Transcendence”

One basic point here concerns the meaning of “transcendence.”  To “transcend” means to go beyond.  Believers in Hick-style “pluralism” understand “transcendent” truths to be truths that transcend or “go beyond” cultural particularity and diversity.  I understand the transcendence of Platonic excellence-ideals to refer to the fact that, whereas our ordinary perceptions of the world around us only reveal to us imperfect examples of goodness, Platonic excellence-ideals “transcend the world” in the perfection of their Goodness.  The pluralist Platonism that I advocate just places no limit on the number of kinds of human excellence there might be, and therefore on the number of excellence ideals that might be perfect in their goodness.

A critical pluralism.

This is still a critical theory, in that not every concept of human excellence can be shown to represent something perfect in its goodness, and there is a rational method for deciding these questions.  A particular excellence concept can be rationally shown to be perfect in its goodness by its ability to withstand serious and sustained Socratic questioning by counterexample.

A more demanding view of religion.

I realize that many will regard these proposals centered on human excellence as deflationary, lessening the seriousness and grandeur that is associated with traditional beliefs in supernatural realities existing in another world beyond the visible world.   In reply: What I advocate here is a much more demanding view of religion, since it involves striving to internalize excellence ideals that are perfect in their goodness–that is, not being satisfied with being “good enough,” but striving for perfection so far as this is possible.  This is far more demanding than merely adopting a particular set of intellectual beliefs of whatever kind.

Key ideas briefly explained here are explained in much more detail on my website mlafargue.com, where I both expand on the theoretical bases for these proposals and give many illustrations of the results in detailed interpretations of classic writings from several very different religious traditions, emphasizing their fundamental deep diversity

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