Overview of Early Buddhist Transformative Spirituality (2)
This chapter continues the overview of sutta teachings basic to early Buddhist spirituality, begun in the previous Overview chapter. Discussions here fall under five headings.
1. Tanha – “Thirst” or “Craving.”
2. Paticca samuppada “Conditioned Arising”
3. An-Atta “not-self.
4. Two uniquely Buddhist meditation practices, known respectively today as Mindfulness-meditation and jhana-meditation.
In an Introductory essay I proposed that claims about Nibbana as a highly exalted achievement should be explained in modern terms by saying that it is a superb kind of ethical/existential excellence. I conclude this chapter with more specific suggestions as to how to understand the specific kind of excellence Nibbana is.
1. Tanha “Craving.”
In the suttas, the terms tanha/Craving and upadana/Clinging are often used interchangeably, or used together to describe the psychological factors that are the main obstacles to achieving the Buddhist goal. For purposes of greater analytical clarity, I will use these two words as technical terms having somewhat different but connected meanings.
I will use upadana/Clinging in the sense defined earlier: inflexible Clinging to particular conditions in the world.
I will use tanha/Craving to describe a deeper and more general orientation built into normal human psychology, a compulsive and outward-directed instinct to seek for sources of meaning and a sense of self-worth through some connection to the world out there.
I will thus treat upadana as tanha particularized: not just a general seeking for some such connection (tanha, as I will call it), but inflexible Clinging (upadana) to some particular conditions. Such inflexible Clinging to particular conditions is the more immediate cause of dukkha, inhibiting a person’s ability to adapt to changes in these particular conditions.
This more particular way of defining tanha as a more general reaching out for some connection to the world out there, serves several purposes here.
First, it pictures tanha/Craving as the more deep-seated motivation for upadana/Clinging. It helps explain the assumption, clearly implicit in the suttas, that liberation from Clinging and dukkha is an immensely difficult, heroic, and rare achievement. It explains why upadana/Clinging is not just an ordinary “attachment” such as I might have for chocolate donuts to eat with my coffee in the morning (which I could give up by a simple act of will-power). The fact that upadana is driven by a very deep need for external confirmation is the reason why it is so inflexible, an “underlying tendency,” deeply rooted in normal human psychology and very difficult to change.
But, secondly, it is important to understand tanha as an outer-directed reaching out for external validation, for external signs confirming one’s sense of self-worth and meaning in life. As I explained at the end of Early Buddhism Overview (1), this is directly opposed to the Buddhist goal of finding meaning-fulfillment within one’s own being, providing a source of meaning independent of unreliable ever-changing conditions in the external world.
These abstract descriptions of tanha/Craving can be concretely clarified by again drawing on some further elements of the story of Kisa Gotami.
One thing well-illustrated in the Gotami story, is the way that the birth of her son initially served for her as a source of external validation in the form of respect from her in-laws. That is, most individuals live their lives feeling relatively secure because most have developed a way of life which provides them with tangible confirmation of their sense of self-worth and meaning in life.
Such individuals do not think of themselves as insecure, but one of Buddhism’s most important revelations is that the insecurity is there. Most individuals are not aware of it because it has been covered over by some relatively stable external circumstances. They have come to rely on this condition for validation of their self-worth and meaning in life. It is when these validating circumstances fail them that they become acutely aware of the insecurity they feel in their absence.
What this reveals are particular underlying psychological factors and dynamics underlying what most people call “normalcy,” the way of being in the world and relating to the world that most people consider normal human life. Such normalcy is not a given.
– People begin with a state of ethical/existential insecurity.
– This feeling of insecurity causes individuals to instinctively reach out for some source of validation in the external world. Most are able to find some relatively stable source of this validation.
– This reaching out for validation typically ends up in upadana, the inflexible “Clinging” to these particular conditions in the world to provide this validation described above.
– People then feel secure until a change in conditions robs them of this validation, revealing to them an underlying feeling of insecurity (manifest as dukkha/Distress) temporarily and unreliably covered over by finding some relatively enduring source of validation.
Tanha as “Thirst”
The Pali word tanha has a literal meaning as “thirst,” and physical thirst serves as a good metaphor for the extremely general sense that tanha has in early Buddhist writing. “Being thirsty” is a state of bodily discomfort, which is at the same time a feeling of urgent need and desire for something specific, e.g. water that will assuage this discomfort. “Being thirsty” is a condition that comes upon a person unwillingly. A thirsty person has not chosen to be thirsty and desirous of water, and she cannot just arbitrarily decide not to be thirsty and not to desire water any more.
The term tanha has some of these resonances in early Buddhist writing. It does not refer to individual “desires” which a person has on particular occasions, and which she might be able to decide on the spot to change at will. It is much more deeply ingrained in normal human nature, normally a very basic part of a person’s way of being in the world and relating to the world. It is an underlying feeling of insecurity and need that might be covered over for a period of time when a person is getting what she needs to get from the world, but will show itself in a feeling of acute need and “thirst” when conditions change and her need is no longer being met. Then it will manifest itself in psychological discomfort and emotional pain (dukkha), accompanied by a strongly felt need and desire for something that will assuage this pain and discomfort.
Tanha in this sense is not just any “desire,” as it is often translated. It is not the result of any conscious decision to want something, and cannot be reduced or eliminated by simply deciding not to want this something any more. Tanha is most often unconscious, an insecurity-driven reaching out for validation that is instinctive, deeply ingrained in normal human nature, and pervasive in the way most people relate to the world. It is what the Pali Suttas call an anusaya, an “underlying tendency.”
In modern psychological jargon, this underlying tendency is something “subconscious,” in that it exerts powerful influence on human attitudes and behavior, but operates on a very basic level normally below the level of conscious awareness. It is deeply ingrained in the normal structure and dynamics of human psychology so that it is difficult to change, and cannot be changed merely by consciously willing it to change. Changing it requires a fundamental and enduring restructuring of a person’s internal psychological dynamics, in such a way that these deep underlying tendencies to Craving and Clinging have been, as the suttas often say “abandoned… cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so they are no more subject to future arising” (see e.g. MN 22.31; Kindle 4132) This is what I mean by saying that reducing or eliminating tanha/upadana is not a matter of repressing this or that “desire” or “attachment” on particular occasions. It is a matter of a much more fundamental and lasting change in a person’s basic way of being in the world and relating to the world.
2. Conditioned Arising.
In its simplest form, the doctrine of Conditioned Arising is expressed in the Pali suttas by the succinct formula:
When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. (MN 115.11, kindle 16577)
In other words, every particular “that” which arises in the world has some other “this” which is the cause or condition of its arising; so when “this” ceases to be, the corresponding “that” will also cease to be.
I think this doctrine plays two roles in early Buddhist teaching.
First, it is one way of elaborating on the doctrine of Impermanence. If there were any condition in the world (any “that”) which had an existence completely independent of other conditions, then this condition would go on existing forever. But this doctrine says that nothing has independent existence. Every “that” arises dependently or conditionally on some prior “this” as its cause, and will cease when its cause ceases. The world out there consists then in a collection of ever changing, conditioned and conditioning conditions, without beginning or end.
I take this also to refer to the mechanical and purposeless nature of change in the world. Early Buddhists did not believe that “everything happens for a purpose.” In this respect, the early Buddhist worldview resembles that of modern physics, which also explains the course of events in the world as the result of impersonal forces, operating according to causal laws without reference to any guiding purposes.
In other words, early Buddhism does not address the problem of life’s meaning by defining “meaning” as primarily a property of “a meaningful universe,” then saying that leading a meaningful human life consists in finding a place for oneself, or playing one’s proper role in this meaningful whole. Instead, early Buddhism is somewhat unique among world religions and spiritualities in this basically deflationary view of the world out there. The practical significance of this deflationary view is to urge people to resist the common human tendency to regard the world out there as the primary site of meaning, and to try to fulfill man’s quest for meaning through some connection to and involvement with the world out there. (The feeling of “oneness with the world” is sometimes associated with Buddhism. But it stands in direct conflict with early Buddhist teaching in the suttas. “Escape” from the entire world-perceived is one metaphor for nibbana in the suttas.
The psychological meaning of Conditioned Arising.
So one facet of the doctrine of Conditioned Arising accounts for changing conditions events in the world on the basis of completely impersonal forces devoid of purpose. Another facet of this doctrine of Conditioned Arising, perhaps more important for present purposes, is the extension of this same idea to the realm of personal psychology. People are under the impression that they are making free choices in the way they choose to relate to the world. Buddhism invites them to see this as an illusion. Responses to the world in the unenlightened person are not due to free choices. Unenlightened individuals are in the grip of deeply rooted underlying tendencies to Craving and Clinging, which in the Buddhist worldview are fundamentally inimical to a person’s true interests. Thus from this perspective, Craving and Clinging are psychological forces comparable to the impersonal and mechanical forces governing events in the external world. The ideal Buddhist will see these as impersonal forces driving her automatically and involuntarily to respond to the world in ways that will only lead to dukkha, suffering and frustration.
This I think is what finds succinct expression in the middle section of the standard account, often repeated in the suttas, spelling out Conditioned Arising in more detail:
Contact (phassa) Conditions Feelings (vedanā)
Feelings Condition Craving (tanha)
Craving Conditions Clinging (upadana).
(See SN 12.1; Kindle 9790)
That is, when a person is still in the grip of underlying tendencies to Craving and Clinging, any perception, any cognitive “contact” (phassa) with the world, awakens these underlying tendencies, and stimulates a certain kind of involuntary feeling-response (vedanā) driven by Craving and Clinging (tanha and upadana).
Those familiar with the work of some modern behaviorist psychological theories will recognize similarities here to modern theories which also regard human free-choice as an illusion. On this view, people are like computer-driven robots. Perceptions of the world are like “inputs,” fed into an internal “program,” which then causes the robot to respond in programmed ways. People are mistaken when they think they are making free choices about how to respond to life-situations which they encounter. Like robots, they are only responding to the world in ways that they have been programmed to respond.
In the Buddhist version, “underlying tendencies” to Craving and Clinging are similar to the “program” causing a robot to respond in predetermined ways to inputs from the world. But in the Buddhist case, this is not the whole story. The purpose of pointing out the unfree character of normal human responses to the world in the unenlightened person, is to evoke horror at this unfreedom, and motivate a person to free herself from these unfree programmed responses driven by Craving and Clinging. Freedom from these involuntary responses is possible, and is one dimension of Buddhist “liberation.”
The Stopping of the Mind.
The ideas discussed above are the proper context for understanding the phrase “the stopping of the mind,” a phrase occurring a short verse in the Sutta Nipata (735)
With the stopping of the mind (viññanassa nirodhena),
There will be no arising of suffering…
A monk, by the calming of the mind,
Hungerless, reaches nibbana.
This is another very good example of extreme succinctness in verbal style, especially evident in the many verse passages quoted in the suttas. Their full meaning only becomes clear when looked on as giving very compressed and succinct expression to several other ideas basic to Buddhist teaching that their early Buddhist audience would have been familiar with. Here I spell their meaning out by putting them in the context of ideas explained earlier in this overview.
That is, in the normal case, a person’s mind is being constantly and involuntarily awakened into activity by contact (phassa) with external stimuli. These involuntary responses are driven by outer-directed Craving for sources of meaning and self-worth in the external world. This in turn ultimately ends up trapping a person in inflexible Clinging to and dependence on particular conditions in the world, leading to endless anxiety and frustration due to constant changes in these conditions.
Buddhist teaching invites us to see these constant, involuntary, Craving-driven responses to the world as a burden. True freedom, Buddhist “liberation,” would be achieved when Craving ceases, so that this kind of Craving-driven mental activity is completely “calmed.” This explains why this verse can describe the Buddhist nibbana-ideal itself as “the stopping of the mind.” As is often the case with very succinct statements in the suttas, this cannot mean the complete stopping of all mental activity on an ongoing basis. One cannot live a life in the world after all mental activity has stopped for good. “Stopping” here must be understood as the stopping of particular kinds of mental activity involuntarily driven by Craving and Clinging.
This “stopped” mind can also be described as a calmed, “quiescent” mind, a mind whose constant and involuntary activity described above has been completely calmed and quieted. As I will explain below, two uniquely Buddhist meditation exercises described in the suttas can be seen as techniques specifically designed to bring about such a completely quieted, quiescent mind.
But as I also noted earlier, one thing Buddhist meditators discovered is that such a quiescent mind would not be a completely blank mind. Quieting all the activity of the mind would result rather in something richly satisfying, a way of satisfying a deep yearning some feel for meaning-fulfillment beyond what is offered by ordinary engagement in social life. “A wonderfully quiescent mind” is one way of describing this.
3. An-atta, “not-self.”
The term an-atta plays an important part in early Buddhist teaching. Its literal meaning is “not-self” (an=”not”, atta=”self”). Considered in context, it means that everything in the world should be considered “not-self”, meaning “not essential to my identity.” Examples would be a job, wealth, reputation, and so on. The goal of Buddhism can be described as developing the difficult ability to refrain from attachment to any particular identity defined in relation to particular conditions in the world, but to regard all conditions as not me, not essential to my identity. In many contexts the compound term Pali an-atta can be best translated by the English phrase “not-me,” as in “my good looks are not me,” “my job is not me,” “my athletic ability is not me,” and so on.
The story of Kisa Gotami can again serve as a good illustrative example here. That is, one way of describing the point of this story is by saying that, when her son was born and gained her status in her husband’s family, she began to Cling inflexibly to a personal identity as mother-of-a-son. The problem Buddhist teaching points to here can be described by saying that this was a “relational identity,” an identity defined in essential relation to some particular condition in the world. More specifically: Gotami’s ability to maintain her identity as mother-of-a-son was dependent on the existence of a living son. Conditions in her life changed drastically when her son died, making her unable to maintain this particular identity. In modern terms, it caused her an “identity-crisis,” a particular kind of dukkha/Distress.
Buddhist doctrine says that all conditions in the world are Impermanent, liable to change beyond prediction and control. This means that Clinging to any personal identity that is essentially defined in relation to any particular condition in the world, is Clinging to something Impermanent. The Impermanence of all conditions in the world means in turn that Clinging to any relational identity makes a person vulnerable to deep Distress when circumstances change making it no longer possible to maintain this relational identity. This is the reason why Buddhism urges individuals to develop the very difficult ability to cease Clinging to any particular relational identity, equivalently described as “regarding all conditions in the world as an-atta ‘not-me,’ ‘not essential to my identity’.”
When we understand the an-atta doctrine as an elaboration of these core Buddhist concepts, we can see that this also gives an added dimension to tanha/“Thirst,” defined as an insecurity-driven Craving for external validation, deeply rooted in normal human psychology. This can now be understood as a deeply rooted Craving to formulate for oneself and maintain a particular “personal identity.”
That is, people feel insecure in themselves unless they can construct some self-image that gives them a recognized and admired place in the world. This is an instinctive need to formulate such a self-image or identity, and the insecurity felt in the absence of such a self-image, is deeply rooted in normal human psychology. And this is what makes it so very difficult to develop the ability to exist and feel comfortable without being deeply dependent on some particular relational identity for one’s sense of self-worth and meaning in life. This is also why it can be so devastating when, as happened to Kisa Gotami, changing circumstances severely undermine some relational identity a person has been Clinging to as a remedy for this insecurity and a source of self-validation.
To be clear: In practice, this would not mean never having any identity. To interact with the world is always to be some particular kind of “self,” to enact a presence-in-the-world of some particular kind. This might be a presence as “a parent,” “a teacher,” “a boss,” “a mechanic,” etc. The Buddhist ideal is not that I should not be any particular kind of “self” in this sense – not that I should never have any identity. The ideal is not to Cling inflexibly to any particular identity, which would manifest itself in practice by the ability to flexibly adapt and play any role called upon by ever-changing circumstances in life. As extreme examples: A former beauty queen caught in a fire would be able to flexibly adapt and be comfortable going through life with a face disfigured. A severely injured star athlete would be able to flexibly adapt and play well the role of a paraplegic in a hospital bed.
To anticipate the result of discussions in the following chapter, it is worth noting here that all this applies, not only to relational identities defined in relation to the external material/social world (like mother-of-a-son), but also any personal identity defined in relation to internal mental/emotional states. For example, in Buddhist teachings, calm feelings experienced “inside” are just as Impermanent as anything in the material/social world “outside.” So inflexible Clinging to an identity as “an always-calm person” makes me just as vulnerable to Distress as Clinging to an identity as a wealthy person would.
As I will explain later, this is related to complicated early Buddhist attitudes to feelings of “spiritual bliss” experienced at meditation. These are a central element in many forms of religious mysticism, including some forms of Hinduism in ancient India contemporary with Buddhism. But in early Buddhist teaching even these kinds of experiences count as transitory and “Impermanent” conditions in the world, potential causes of Distress for anyone who becomes Attached to them.
5. Meditation.
One very helpful feature of early Buddhist teachings is that the suttas not only describe a particular ideal of internal transformation to be achieved, but also provide practical techniques effective in bringing about this transformation. This makes early Buddhism not just a set of doctrines to be believed in, but more essentially a set of transformational ideals accompanied by a set of techniques for bringing about this transformation. The main such techniques are meditation exercises.
“Meditation” is a term that has been used to refer to many different kinds of mental exercises, taught in many different traditions, aimed to achieve many different goals. Some meditation exercises taught in the Pali suttas are found in other religious traditions as well. But in this book I give special attention to two particular meditation exercises taught in the suttas that are quite unique to early Buddhism, bearing a unique relation to the unique character of the kind of internal transformation which is the Buddhist ideal.
In this overview essay, I want to focus on one meditation technique taught in the Satipatthana Sutta, commonly called today “mindfulness” meditation.
The essence of this technique consists in what this sutta calls “bare awareness.” I think this can be more fully explained as “non-reactive awareness.” It does not matter what you are aware of. Whatever you are paying attention to, pay attention to it without reacting in any way to what you are attending to. For example, you might pay attention to thoughts going through your mind. Do not try to stop the thoughts, but also avoid letting yourself get involved in actively thinking about the thoughts.
I explain the purpose of Mindfulness meditation in connection with the psychological aspect of the doctrine of Conditioned Arising as described above. According to this doctrine, most of our reactions to conditions and events (external and internal) are involuntary reactions driven in one way or another by Craving and Clinging. Non-reactive awareness is one way of liberating oneself from being under the sway of these involuntary impulses driven by Craving and Clinging.
This emphasis on the practical-transformational significance of Buddhist teachings, and on meditation-practices as a means of bringing about this transformation, reflects my view that it is a mistake to suppose that, for early Buddhists, commitment to the Buddhist path can be reduced to being intellectually committed to believing in the truth of some Buddhist doctrines claiming to represent the nature of reality.
Problems and iSolutions
This concludes my overview of core Buddhist teachings in these two Overview chapters. I want also now to continue a discussion of some problems.
The first problem.
On the one hand, the suttas make highly exalted claims concerning Nibbana, as the very highest achievement of which mankind is capable. When the Buddha achieved Nibbana this placed him in a category completely separate from the rest of us, and vastly superior. While remaining a human being rather than a supernatural, divine deva, he became the highest of all beings in the universe of beings.
The approach that I take understands this, for purposes of critical reasoning, as putting Nibbana in the general category of “the Good,” broadened to include the idea of existential fulfillment, a superb way of fulfilling man’s quest for meaning (See Frankl 2020). I take this as a very central claim, important also for individuals interested in practicing today the path laid out in the suttas. Such a person needs assurance that progress on the Buddhist path will make her a better person, raising her life to higher level of ethical/existential excellence. I take it as part of my task in this book to support this kind of claim with good reasons
But two features of the style of writing in the suttas make this a challenging task. First, predominant descriptions of Nibbana in the suttas are negative, describing what “ceases” when Nibbana is achieved. Nibbana is “the cessation of Clinging,” which brings about “the cessation of Distress (dukkha)”. One cannot achieve the highest state available to mankind merely by lacking something. Supporting this claim requires at a minimum giving some positive content to the Nibbana idea. Exactly what is ethically “good” or existentially “meaningful” about this state? Absent any specific and convincing answer to this question, one is left with the assumption that large numbers of individuals in ancient India were motivated to leave home and family, live a Spartan and homeless life of wandering ascetics begging for their sustenance, (1) all for no comprehensible reason, or (2) merely to avoid emotional distress, or worse, (3) because they were nihilist haters of their own existence who would like as much as possible to withdraw from human existence.
One thing that might help us understand and explain the positive content that the Nibbana ideal held for early Buddhists, would be concrete examples of what life would be like after having achieved Nibbana, or having made substantial progress toward this ideal. But here we meet another limitation inherent in the way Nibbana is described in the suttas–the almost complete lack of any such concrete examples. Explanations of what Nibbana is are given almost entirely in the form of highly abstract descriptions of internal psychological factors that must be overcome, or which are done away with, when Nibbana is achieved.
Here then is a dilemma inherent in the teaching materials that have come down to us in the suttas, inherent in the approach that I take to these materials. My concern for the particularity of the Nibbana-ideal leads me to want to stick as closely as possible to the very particular ways this ideal is described in the suttas, avoiding importing into my interpretation concepts not given or suggested in the suttas themselves. And yet, for reasons explained above, another facet of my approach–my focus on Nibbana as a superb kind ethical/existential excellence–requires that my explanations go beyond anything explicitly said in the suttas themselves on this topic.
So what follows here are my attempts to fill in something essential to the approach that I take to the interpretation of early Buddhist teaching, but which necessarily involves bringing in ideas not explicitly given in the suttas themselves. I offer these as examples of the general kinds of ideas necessary for anyone concerned to explain good reasons supporting early Buddhist claims about Nibbana as the highest state. At the same time I acknowledge that others may think of different ways of doing this.
Three ideas are basic to my suggestions here.
#1. First, while it is true Craving and Clinging are deeply ingrained in normal human psychology and pervasive motivational forces in all normal human interactions with the world, these are not the only drivers of such human interactions. One cannot live a life in the world, interacting with the world with no motivations whatsoever. Specifically then, can we think of other kinds of admirable motivations that might remain after a person greatly reduces or eliminates Craving and Clinging (1) that would remain after Craving and Clinging cease, and (2) would not make a person vulnerable to dukkha “Distress”?
#2. Secondly, inflexible Clinging limits one’s capacity to respond actively and meaningfully to the wide range of situations that might arise in life. This is well illustrated in the story of Kisa Gotami, when the death of her son caused a kind of emotional paralysis. Rather than trying to find ways of moving on and leading a good life under these new circumstances, she became emotionally consumed with fruitless and completely hopeless attempts to undo an event which could not be undone. The positive and admirable opposite of this would be resilience and flexible adaptation in the face of difficult and threatening circumstances.
#3. I suggest, finally, another idea connected with the an-atta teaching. This teaching is directed against the human tendency to become Attached to a particular identity, a particular self-image or role in the world which then becomes an essential basis for a person’s sense of self-esteem. Maintaining this particular identity then becomes the focus of a great deal of attention and effort. It often causes purely defensive reactions when one’s ability to maintain a particular identity, and play a particular role in the world, becomes threatened. Rather than giving one’s attention to find good and meaningful ways of reacting to new and unwanted circumstances, one becomes emotionally consumed with the threat posed by these circumstances, preventing one from moving on.
But imagine a case in which all that I manage to accomplish in life would be to maintain and defend a particular identity. I then die having accomplished nothing else meaningful or good in itself. This will have been a meaningless life.
To begin then with #1 above. I suggest that the problem here can be addressed based on a distinction between “expressive” and “need-based” motivations. Craving causes a need-based relation to the world, relating to the world on the basis of a need to get something from the world, some validation or confirmation of one’s sense of self-worth. When this end is not achieved, when conditions in the world fail to provide this validation and confirmation, this is the cause of Distress and emotional paralysis.
Contrast this with “expressive” motivations, actions whose end is achieved in the action itself, because the actions are motivated just by a desire to express one’s goodness. Then the end is achieved in the action itself, nothing more needs to be achieved, which also means that no deep Distress will occur due to failure to achieve some further end.
“Expressive” motivations are well exemplified in the case of some artists. Some artists are motivated by a desire to become famous and make money, in which case failure and Distress are quite possible when fame and wealth do not appear. But it is possible to paint just for the sake of expressing oneself in the painting. In this case the end is achieved in the act of expression itself, so that success does not depend on anything beyond the act of self-expression.
I offer “self-expression” as a kind of motivation for interactions with the world that can persist and be enhanced when Craving and Clinging are motivations that are greatly weakened or disappear. This is also a kind of motivation that, unlike Craving and Clinging, would not make a person vulnerable to deep Distress.
(I first came across the idea of “expressing yourself” in connection with Buddhism, in a copy of talks given by Zen Buddhist teacher Shunryu Suzuki (published as Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind), where this idea is repeated quite often. See for example p 5, 7,17, 30-36, 59-60, 72-76.)
I spoke above of “the desire to express one’s goodness.” That is, I assume that in this case “expressive” motivations are expressive of some kinds of human goodness, some kinds of “virtues” to use a common Western concept. The suttas do often urge the practice of certain particular virtues –”compassion” being a prominent and well-known example that figures often in the suttas and in many current presentations of Buddhism. But I want to extend the basic idea so that it is not limited to any particular list of virtues. Transitioning to a more “expressive” and less “need-based” motivation has the potential to purify the exercise of any virtue, purify any virtue of more self-centered kinds of motivations. This then is connected to #3 above, insofar as the desire to protect and defend a particular identity, connected to a particular role to play in the world, can be a manifestation of a certain kind of self-centeredness. A lessening of this kind of self-centered need for support from the world, is ideally accompanied by a desire to react to situations in a way that expresses whatever kind of goodness or virtue is appropriate to any given situation.
A final idea I want to suggest is related to #2 above, the fact that inflexible Clinging limits the range of circumstances to which one can actively and positively respond. Again the case of Kisa Gotami is instructive. Because she Clung in such a fixed way to the status which being mother-of-a-son gave her, the death of her son caused a kind of emotional paralysis. Rather than drawing on her own resources to find some positive, good and meaningful way of responding to this loss, this event was so threatening that it caused a purely defensive reaction, a fruitless opposition to the event itself.
To generalize the lesson here: Human beings, just as human beings, have a potentially limitless innate capacity to “rise to any occasion,” to react to any situation in a good and meaningful way. But in the normal case of the unenlightened individual, inflexible Clinging to particular conditions, or to some particular relational identity, limits this innate capacity. Such Clinging brings it about that certain unexpected and undesired events are felt as deeply threatening, causing an inability to fully accept the changed circumstances, so that one resists and responds with unproductive anger, depression, or despair directed at the circumstances themselves.
The positive opposite of this could be described in terms of an unshakeable and completely self-contained self-confidence. In the ordinary case, self-confidence usually has some basis: My self-confidence is dependent on my good looks, my wealth or status, some particular skills that I have, and so on. Nibbana could then be described as the opposite: A self-contained self-confidence would be unshakeable because it is not dependent on any conditions in the world that might change.
These ideas can form the basis for giving positive content to the definition of Nibbana as “the cessation of Clinging.” If inflexible Clinging to particular circumstances limits an innate human capacity to respond positively and creatively to a potentially limitless range of circumstances, then “the cessation of Clinging,” can be seen as removing this kind of limitation, and restoring the potentially limitless capacity that human beings possess for responding in a good and meaningful way to all possible circumstances that might occur in life.
These general ideas about how to understand the positive content of the Nibbana ideal, are based on a concept of “analogy,” which has its source in the writings of Plato. Applied especially to religious beliefs, this is the idea that, although some religious concepts representing the highest reality are in themselves quite difficult to grasp (certainly true of Buddhist Nibbana), we do have access to some starting points for understanding them, in the form of some more familiar experiences and concepts that are “analogous to” this highest reality. In is in this sense that I would say that the ordinary virtue of self-confidence is not Nibbana itself, but it is “analogous to” Nibbana. The goodness we perceive in the ordinary virtue of self-confidence provides us with a starting point for understanding the difficult-to-understand goodness of Nibbana.
When thinking further of familiar admirable human qualities that might be analogous to Nirvana, one of the most basic such qualities can be described as The ability to find satisfaction in solitude, alone with one’s own being. This is what the Suttas call “true seclusion.” A person can be physically “secluded” from human society and still lack the psychological ability to find satisfaction in the absence of social stimulation and interaction.
One way of explaining why this is an admirable quality is to contrast it with some of its extreme opposites: A person with a compulsive need for constant stimulation or conversation, a person unable to put up with silence, or who becomes extremely uneasy and anxious if she has to be alone for any length of time. Conversely, achieving a very high degree of the virtue of “true seclusion” would give a person increased ability to endure solitary confinement.
True seclusion is one of the results of meditation. Reducing interaction with the world, acquiring a taste for being alone with one’s own being and the deeply satisfying peace that can come with this. A person able to find this kind of inner satisfaction feels less need to reach out to the world to satisfy a desire for meaning in life.
A second more familiar quality analogous to Nirvana is self-confidence, the opposite of feeling insecure. Nirvana can be described as a more self-contained self-confidence. Normal self-confidence is based on some conditions that might change beyond one’s control – as for example bodily beauty or strength, some particular skills or achievements, admiration from other people, and so on. Progress toward Nirvana should provide a person with self-confidence that is more independent of such changeable conditions, more “self-contained” in this sense. If Gotami had had more self-contained self-confidence, she would not have been so extremely distraught at the loss of status among her in-laws accompanying the death of her son.
A third analogous virtue can be described negatively as being less self-referential, less prone to “taking things personally.” This too is well-illustrated in the Gotami story. In the story, Gotami’s grief was less grief for her son, and more grief for herself. She experienced the death of her son not so much as happening-to-him, but more happening-to-her. An insecure person, lacking internal security and self-confidence, needs more confirmation from the world, and this gives her a more self-referential perspective on things happening in the world, more sensitive to personal slights, more likely to “take things personally.” Witnessing the good fortune of others brings comparative thoughts, “Why her and not me?” Seeing an overweight person brings up thoughts of “At least I’m not that fat.” Progress toward Nirvana should make a person less self-centered and more other-centered, more able to celebrate the good fortune of others and experience the misfortunes of others empathically from the perspective of the others suffering these misfortunes.
A third analogy to Nirvana is flexible adaptability, resilience, composure. This isthe ability to accept and creatively “rise to the occasion” in unexpected life-circumstances that make this difficult. For example, if Kisa Gotami had had more self-contained self-confidence, she would not have been so dependent on the regard of her in-laws, and more able to accept and flexibly adapt to new circumstances thrust upon her by the death of her son. We could describe her state as a kind of emotional paralysis. The death of her son was such a shock to her system that it completely consumed her attention, making her unable to begin the process of healing and drawing on her resources and beginning to imagine a different life for herself.
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