Amicus meus Plato, sed magis amica veritas. (“Plato is my friend, but truth is a greater friend.” Latin proverb.)
[This paper introduces an approach to Plato more fully developed in my book on Plato: Rational Spirituality and Divine Virtue in Plato: a modern interpretation and philosophical defense of Platonism. SUNY Pr. 2017.]
Many developments have taken place since Plato wrote his dialogues, forcing us to face today questions and issues that Plato himself did not really make the main focus of his discussions. He was able to leave vague and undecided questions that we cannot leave vague and undecided today. The main developments I am referring to are developments in the physical sciences (modern physics, chemistry, and biology), and developments in the historical and cultural sciences (history, anthropology, sociology).
For example, Plato describes perfect Platonic virtue-Forms as “really real,” (ontōs on in Greek), more real than the visible concrete reality we see around us. From our modern perspective, Plato was able to leave it rather vague what “real” means in these statements. It could mean that Platonic Forms are thing-like entities really and objectively existing in a kind of parallel universe, but Plato could also be using these terms in a less literal sense.
The modern physical sciences have developed rational methods for investigating physical reality that have immensely sharpened our concept of what it means to be “real,” and what it means to show rationally that something is “real.” Platonic Forms clearly cannot be rationally shown to be “real” in this modern sense of the word “real.” But of course Plato did not really address this question in its modern form. This modern development forces us to be much more specific than Plato was, concerning what it might mean to say that the Forms are “really real.”
Similarly, Plato described the Forms as “always being” (aei on). This phrase in Greek is in itself rather vague. It could mean that there is only one Platonic Heaven inhabited by a single small set of genuine Platonic Forms, and that anyone from any culture in any historical era who gets her head into this Platonic Heaven would see exactly the same set of Platonic Forms, since these Forms “exist Eternally,” above all cultural diversity and historical change.
But aei is the ordinary Greek word for “always,” as in (“I always take the bus,”) so it could have a much less weighted meaning (I wouldn’t say “I eternally take the bus”).
The modern cultural sciences (history, anthropology, sociology), unknown to Plato, have enabled us to understand and also appreciate the great diversity in the ideals various cultures have developed in various historical periods. This has immensely sharpened our idea about what it might mean to claim that there are some truths that transcend all this cultural diversity and historical change. Visitors to Athens from other parts of the Mediterranean world may have made Plato vaguely aware of this problem. But this never became a central focus of his thought, certainly not the way it has become a central focus for so much of modern thought since the development of the modern cultural sciences.
These modern developments again force us to be much more specific than Plato was, about what exactly it means to say of Platonic Forms that they are “always being.”
The problem with a great deal of modern Plato-interpretation is that it tends to treat Plato’s statements literally at face value, as answers to these very modern questions. And it does so in a way that typically makes Plato come down on the wrong side of these questions, turning “Platonism” into a set of doctrines that by modern standards have no rational foundation whatsoever, and cannot stand up to modern rational questioning. In this picture, Plato, one of the key founders of rational Western philosophy, turns out to have staked everything on a set of doctrines with no rational foundation whatsoever! As Richard Rorty, recent head of the American Philosophical Association once said of the current philosophical scene, today “No one wants to be called a Platonist.”
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The present essays aim to rescue Plato from this modern fate by a “critical reconstruction” of some central elements of Plato’s thought about Platonic Forms.
In the case of Plato, to say that this will be a “critical” reconstruction means that, instead of asking, “What did Plato believe?” I will ask, “What did Plato have good reasons to believe?” — reasons that we can still regard as good reasons today. Does Plato have anything important to teach us that we can rationally know to be true?
To say that this will be a “reconstruction” means that this will involve a creative process of interpreting what Plato says, being much more specific than Plato was about what phrases like “really real” and “always being” could mean, limiting their meaning to claims that actually can be shown to have a rational basis, not any kind of rational basis, but a basis in some mode of reasoning that is also found in Plato.
Critical reconstruction tries to devise a critical and creative interpretation of some of central beliefs, in such a way that these beliefs can be supported by Platonist reasoning methods.
As a rough analogy: Think of the thought expressed in Plato’s writing as a very large and sprawling building. (Plato hardly ever writes in his own voice, and the views he puts into the mouths of others cover an amazing variety of topics.) Critical reconstruction means examining which parts of this building have a solid foundation in some reasoning method Plato offers us, and which do not. Those that do not have a solid foundation we should let fall, lest they bring the entire building down. The “reconstructed” body of Plato’s thought is what will remain when we let the other parts fall.
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More specifically, the “reasoning method” found in Plato I will be describing consists largely of a method he claims to have learned from Socrates. I will argue that Plato’s theory of virtue-Forms, in its most otherworldly form, is a central part of Plato’s “building” that can be supported by a kind of “Socratic reasoning.” But this requires creative adjustment:
– Not every kind of reasoning attributed to “Socrates” in Plato’s dialogues offers support for Plato’s theory of virtue-Forms. We need to construct some version of Socratic reasoning capable of supporting some version of this theory.
– Not everything said of the Forms in Plato’s dialogues can be supported by Socratic reasoning. We need to construct some version of Plato’s theory of virtue-Forms that can be supported by Socratic reasoning.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this critical reconstruction is limiting the claims made about Platonic virtue-Forms, not claiming more than can be supported by Socratic reasoning. This is what is not commonly done in modern interpretations of Plato. Plato’s Form theory is commonly assumed to necessarily involve certain claims that go well beyond what Plato (or anyone else) can rationally support with good reasons, with the result that the entire theory is rejected by most contemporary philosophers.
To be more specific, as critically reconstructed in the essays to follow:
“Socratic reasoning” starts with an ordinary virtue-concept, any virtue concept, that an individual has learned from her culture. It is a method (described in detail later) of uncovering imperfections in this individual’s ordinary understand of this virtue-concept, and of remedying those imperfections by developing more and more refined definitions and understandings of this concept. Socratic reasoning is self-critical self-exploration, staying within the thoughts and experience of a single individual, without regard for agreement or disagreement with the thoughts and experiences of others.
A “Platonic Form” is a virtue-concept that is perfect in its goodness, referring only and always to something perfectly good. (The Platonic Form of Courage, for example, would be a concept of courage that would only and always represent courage in its most perfectly admirable form.) From the point of view of rational method, a Platonic Form can be described as a virtue-concept that can withstand Socratic questioning — it is so refined that Socratic questioning can find no more imperfections in it. The purpose of a Platonic Form is to provide an individual with a perfect model to mold her own character on (not a basis for social legislation imposing moral obligations on others).
If we limit our understanding of Platonic Forms to what can be supported by Socratic reasoning, one key result would be to reject the common idea that there is only one Platonic Heaven inhabited by a single small set of genuine Platonic Forms, and that anyone from any culture in any historical era who gets her head into this Platonic Heaven would see exactly the same set of Platonic Forms, since these Forms “exist Eternally,” above all cultural diversity and historical change. I think it is unclear whether Plato believed in such a single set of Absolute Truths or not. But for purposes of critical reconstruction it doesn’t essentially matter what Plato himself personally believed or did not believe on this matter. Since, as I conceive it here, Socratic reasoning starts from particular “culturally conditioned” virtue-concepts, and stays within the culturally conditioned thoughts and experiences of single individuals, it is incapable of reaching any conclusions rationally known to be Absolute and Universal, transcending all cultural particularity and historical change.
But dropping this “Single Truth” idea leaves completely unaffected a completely different idea and goal of Socratic reasoning: Formulating perfect virtue-concepts for purposes of individual self-molding. A “perfect” concept is just a concept that lacks imperfections. The terms “Absolute” and “Universal” are completely different in their meaning. “Absolute” means “not influenced by anything particular to some particular culture, not universal to all cultures.” “Perfect” does not mean “Absolute” in this sense. A given virtue-concept might still be very particular to one culture, unknown in other cultures, and still be a concept perfect in its goodness, able to withstand Socratic questioning.
For those already somewhat familiar with what is called “Platonism” today, it is important to note that I am restricting Plato’s Form-theory to virtue Forms, not to all general concepts or “essences”. (Aristotle, Plato’s sometime pupil, ridicules Plato’s alleged belief in an objectively existing and timeless Form of “horseness”, the timeless essence of what it means to be a horse. Whatever Plato himself believed, I want to restrict my treatment here to virtue Forms, and their practical use as ideal models on which an idealistic person might mold his character, as they are described in the middle chapters of Plato’s Republic.)
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The following discussion of an excerpt from Plato-scholar Richard Robinson will illustrate the more usual approach to Plato-interpretation, contrasting sharply with the present attempt at “critical reconstruction.” Instead of adjusting his sense of the goal of reasoning to what can actually be achieved by Socratic reasoning, Robinson assumes that arriving at universal truths must the goal of all reasoning, and since Socratic reasoning cannot achieve this goal, it must be judged “defective.”
In making this argument, Robinson first accurately describes what I also take to be a key “individualist” principle of Socratic reasoning — the fact that it has to rely only on the perceptions of a single individual. This is the “midwife” principle Socrates describes in Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus (quoted in Appendix 2 ): Socrates does not argue with others or teach his own wisdom, but only tries to help individuals articulate their own intuitive perceptions, “delivering their intellectual babies,” the way a midwife helps women deliver their physical babies.
Robinson clearly sees that any kind of reasoning which stays within the orbit of a single individual’s thought is completely incapable of bringing an individual beyond the particularity of her own thought to arrive at universal truths which all people everywhere would agree upon.
However, Robinson seems also to think that Plato himself must have believed in such universal truths, so Plato must have (mistakenly) believed that he had found some way of overcoming this limitation in Socratic reasoning. Critical reconstruction advocates the opposite: Limit the claims made about Platonic Forms to what can be supported by individualist Socratic reasoning.
Here is the relevant section of Robinson’s discussion of Socratic inquiry, which he calls by its Greek name elenchos (Latinized to elenchus).
The Socratic elenchus is a very personal affair… If the ulterior end of the elenchus is to be attained, it is essential that the answerer himself be convinced, and quite indifferent whether anyone else is…
Whereas in law-courts you have to convince a third party, namely the judges, in the Socratic elenchus you have to convince your opponent himself. Hence the witnesses who are so effective at trials are useless here. The only true witness and authority is the answerer himself; and if he does not admit the fact, it is irrelevant how many others do. The result depends not on a majority of votes, but on the single vote of the answerer…
The whole essence of the elenchus lies in making visible to the answerer the link between certain of his actual beliefs and the contradictory of his present thesis. (“Elenchus” by Richard Robinson, in The Philosophy of Socrates, ed. G. Vlastos. NY: Doubleday. 1971, p. 88)
So far, I completely agree. This individualist principle is essential to the Socratic reasoning developed in subsequent essays. Robinson however then goes on to stress the fact that, in his eyes, this results in a severe “defect” in Socratic reasoning — because critically examining the thought of a single individual clearly cannot contribute to what Robinson calls “the universal rational march of science,” i.e. it will not lead to discovering that one single set of “universal” moral Absolutes, the single correct set of moral norms valid and obligatory for all people everywhere.
By addressing itself always to this person here and now, elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness, which are defects. In this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal rational march of a science axiomatized according to Aristotle’s prescription. Plato might urge, however, that elenchus is the means by which the irrational and accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of universal science, brought out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason. [ibid. p. 89]
In other words, Robinson himself thinks that the absolutely essential task of all reasoning must be to bring individuals out of their particularity and their accidental cultural conditioning into a single common world which all rational persons will agree to. He thinks this is absolutely essential, because he thinks that reasoning which cannot do this is no reasoning at all, but leaves each individual in the grip of her own “irrational” and “arbitrary” ideas and beliefs.
Robinson thinks Plato must have realized this, and so must have had some concept of elenchus which would make it into “a means by which the irrational and accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of universal science, brought out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason.”
The problem is that no one thinks today that Plato’s writing offers us any such alternate mode of reasoning capable of contributing to some universal march of moral science.
This has in fact become a serious problem today, not only for Platonism, but for philosophy generally. Early modern philosophers like John Locke and Immanuel Kant were immensely impressed by the universal march of the physical sciences based the scientific reasoning methods developed by Galileo and Newton. They hoped to do for all knowledge what Newton did for physics. Just as Newton discovered the one true physics, they hoped to find a mode of reasoning that would enable them to discover the one universally true set of moral principles, valid for all people everywhere.
This proved to be overambitious. And in philosophy, overambition is the mother of skepticism. The fact that no one has actually found a widely-persuasive mode of reasoning capable of establishing a “universal moral science,” has resulted in a general skepticism about moral reason. Many non-philosophers think that “everyone has their own opinions” when it comes to morality, and there is no rational way of bringing them to the same common opinions. The writings of Richard Rorty show that the most influential philosophers in the last two centuries (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida) actually share this skepticism about a universal moral science. These philosophers show that there are philosophical reasons why philosophy cannot fulfill its ambitions of creating a “universal science” on the Newtonian model. There are various proposals among philosophers for resolving the general mood of skepticism that results from this failure, but none have proved widely persuasive.
The present “critical reconstruction” is a way of addressing this problem, by limiting our expectations of moral reasoning.
First, let us accept the individualist, “midwife” principle of Socratic reasoning. Socratic moral reasoning is self-critical self-exploration, asking each individual to build her moral ideals on the basis of her own moral experience — as Robinson says, uncovering and trying to resolve contradictions within her own perceptions and beliefs. This means relying on perceptions that are “subjective” (in the sense that only human subjects have moral perceptions), and “culturally conditioned” (in the sense that socialization in some particular culture, learning to speak some particular language, is necessary to becoming fully human). Wide knowledge of the perceptions and beliefs of others, or agreement/disagreement with others, is irrelevant to this individual self-critical self-exploration.
Secondly, we should limit our expectations to what can plausibly be achieved by individualist self-critical self-exploration. Since the method is individualist, the goal must also be individualist. Since subjective and culturally conditioned perceptions are the ultimate basis for this reasoning, it is incapable of yielding knowledge that is completely objective, or of yielding “universal truths” transcending all cultural particularity.
I argue that these limitations leave the most important elements of Plato’s Form theory intact — if, that is, we consider “the most important elements” to be the formulation of morally perfect virtue-ideals for individual Platonists to mold their character on. That is, Socratic reasoning offers each individual a rational method for critical development of her own moral ideals, yielding a rational basis for improving the moral quality of her own character, independently of what anyone else in her society or elsewhere thinks or does not think, does or does not do.
In other words, Robinson is not correct in his supposition that arbitrary and irrational individuality is the only alternative to “the universal march of science.”
A Platonic Form is a virtue-concept that can be shown by Socratic reasoning to be perfect in its goodness. “Perfect” is very different from “Universal” or “Absolute.”
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to take for these purposes.
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One central purpose of this critical reconstruction is to render irrelevant the most common objections to Platonist thought, and to moral reasoning generally.
Here are some common objections, with replies.
– “Socratic reasoning cannot lead people to universal agreement.”
Yes. But this doesn’t matter. This reasoning works for any individual wanting to think critically about her own moral ideals, independently of whether anyone agrees with them or not.
– “Socratic reasoning cannot provide a basis for moral order in society, providing a set of moral rules rationally shown to be obligatory for everyone.”
Yes. But this doesn’t matter. Any individual can use Socratic reasoning to develop standards of moral excellence for themselves that this reasoning can show are more well-founded, more precise, and more morally excellent than the more imperfect, imprecise, and morally mediocre norms generally prevalent in any given society. She can improve her own life by on this basis, and this is good in itself, whether or not it is connected to more widespread social change.
– “Socratic reasoning cannot enable individuals to transcend their own cultural conditioning.”
Yes. But this doesn’t matter. The essential goal of Socratic reasoning has nothing to do with transcending all cultural conditioning. For example, each culture provides its individual members with a specific language and specific virtue concepts particular to this culture. Such concepts provide indispensable raw material for Socratic reasoning. Socratic reasoning is essentially a process of refining this cultural raw material. For example, socialization in American culture provides individuals with a concept of “romantic love” that is relatively imperfect and imprecise, able to be applied to such things as infatuation and insecurity-driven co-dependence. Socratic reasoning is a method for developing a more refined and precise version of this American concept. This more refined version may or may not also turn out to be more universal, but this doesn’t crucially matter. It can be more refined even if it is not more universal. Refinement, not universality, is the essential goal.
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To make this last point more concrete, consider the hypothetical case of a Mexican Platonist Carla, and a Russian Platonist Natasha. Each independently conducts a Socratic discussion of some concept roughly equivalent in their culture to the concept designated by the English word “fairness.” Since each begins with a somewhat different concept, and each relies on different life-experiences and different culturally conditioned perceptions, each comes up with a somewhat different “Platonic Form” of Fairness.
Both concepts can be shown by Socratic/Platonic reasoning to be perfect in their goodness. In fact, when Carla reads Natasha’s discussion, she agrees that Natasha’s reasoning shows that Natasha’s concept does represent a virtue perfect in its goodness. It’s just that Carla knows that her different concept is also perfect in its goodness (Natasha agrees to this), so can serve equally well as a moral ideal to mold one’s character on. Carla does not disagree that Natasha’s concept is perfect in its goodness. Her “disagreement” only consists in her choice of a different concept to serve as her own moral ideal.
How many virtues are there, and how many equivalent Platonic virtue-Forms are there? Neither Socratic reasoning, nor any other reasoning method found in Plato’s writings, is capable of rationally limiting the number of perfect Platonic Forms there might be. Consequently, critical reconstruction of Plato’s thought must avoid making the claim that some particular limited list of Platonic virtue-Forms is a closed list, that there can be no other Platonic Forms outside this list.
That is, suppose someone want to establish a single set of moral ideals, the single valid choice for all individuals everywhere who want to be virtuous. The problem for such a person is not that there are no “universal truths,” but that there are too many of them. It might be universally true that each virtue on Platonist-Natasha’s virtue-list is a genuine Platonic Form. But it might also be universally true that each virtue on Platonist-Carla’s completely different virtue-list is also a genuine Platonic Form. This point can be extended indefinitely to many different Platonists in different cultures and historical eras.
This leaves the personal and individual function of the Forms intact. Carla and Natasha can each be assured that any virtue concept shown to be perfect by their own individual Socratic/Platonic reasoning, is indeed perfect in its goodness, and so is much better able to serve as a personal ideal than the imperfect concepts they learned growing up. This has nothing to do with whether each will agree on the same set of virtues to mold their characters on. Goodness is different from universality, and perfect goodness is different from perfect universality.
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to take for these purposes.
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Today, resistance to moral reasoning is often driven by the association of moral reasoning with claims about universal truths, and the fear that claims to universal truths will be used to try to force everyone into the same mold. Such forced standardization fails to recognize that there are potentially innumerable ways of being a admirable human being. By fully endorsing and emphasizing the individualist principle of Socratic reasoning described above by Robinson, the present reconstruction is also fully in accord with the modern insistence on cultural diversity and individual uniqueness. It does this without lapsing into the arbitrary individualism Robinson describes, i.e. without leaving the question of “What is virtue?” a matter of completely arbitrary personal whim. If a virtue is anything anyone arbitrarily decides to label a virtue, this empties the word “virtue” of any meaning, and there really is no difference between an admirable life and a life that is not admirable.
The real problem Socratic/Platonic reasoning sets itself is not to decide what is a virtue and what is not a virtue, or decide which virtues deserve to be given priority always and everywhere, or to decide whether Jane’s ideas of virtue are better than Susan’s ideas of virtue. This reasoning can take as a starting point any personality trait that anyone finds admirable, any way that a person can begin to articulate what it is she admires about others or values highly in herself. But this is only a something to begin with, and one result of Socratic reasoning is to show that all easy-to-understand starting points will be imperfect and imprecise as descriptions of something only and always perfectly admirable. Socratic reasoning requires a person to make strenuous efforts to seek out contradictions within her own thought concerning the virtue she has chosen as a starting point, and to refine her concepts by trying to resolve these contradictions. The initial choice of a virtue-concept to begin with is to some extent arbitrary, but formulating the perfect Platonic Form of this virtue is by no means arbitrary.
What Socratic reasoning really shows people is not that they are mistaken in their choice of which qualities to admire or value about themselves, but how inarticulate they are in trying to articulate exactly why they admire some particular quality, reflecting an equivalent unclarity in their thinking.
The result of this critical reconstruction is an individualist and critical-pluralist Platonism.
It is individualist in that is designed to be done by individuals, based only their own individual moral experience, for the purpose of providing themselves with a more perfect focus for moral commitment and self-evaluation. (“Individualist” should not be taken to indicate lack of concern for others or society. Individuals generally need social virtues, such as a “concern for fairness,” “kindness,” “empathy,” etc.)
“Pluralist” refers to a recognition that there is a potentially indefinite plurality of genuine Platonic virtue-Forms.
“Critical” means that not just virtue-concept qualifies as a Platonic Form, and there is a rational method of differentiating between those concepts that do and those that do not.
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Did Plato himself advocate such an individualist and critical-pluralist Platonism. Did he limit his claims about the Forms in this particular way? In a previous publication on Plato I tried to show that careful attention to context in these passages shows that this limitation is in accord with the main point of these passages. But this does not essentially matter, since critical reconstruction does not ask, “What did Plato actually believe?” but “What did Plato have good reasons to believe — good reasons that we can still regard as good reasons today?” If some of Plato’s claims about the Forms exceeded what he could rationally demonstrate, we must reject these parts of the Platonic philosophical edifice, but not let them bring the entire building down with them.
Critical reconstruction is in accord with the rational spirit of Plato’s thought. Why did he write dialogues rather than essays straightforwardly explaining his own beliefs? Dialogues intend to engage readers in personally thinking through the issues, posing the most fundamental questions, raising fundamental doubts, and trying to resolve these doubts. To really understand Plato we need to think along with him about the fundamental issues that engaged him. His Seventh Letter was written partly in response to someone’s claim to have written an essay explaining “Plato’s idea of the Good.” In response, he says essentially that the reasoning he does is something each person must do for herself. He says he will never write an essay explaining his idea of the Good, because a true mental grasp of a Platonic Form cannot be done by reading the results of someone else’s reasoning.
Here is what he says:
One statement… I can make in regard to all who have written… with a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which I devote myself… Such writers can in my opinion have no real acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in regard to it nor shall I ever do so in future, for this subject matter [pragma] is by no means capable of being expressed in words like other subjects… rather, after prolonged being-with and living-with the subject matter, suddenly, like a light kindled by a leaping spark, having come into being in the soul, it then nourishes itself. (341c-d)
As a Latin proverb later put it: Amicus meus Plato, sed magis amica veritas. “Plato is my friend, but truth is a greater friend.” I think Plato would have approved of this.
Appendix 1: A list of some virtues.
How many virtues are there?
Here is a possible list of different clusters of virtues, using words and phrases commonly used today to describe people we admire:
responsible, loyal, diligent, disciplined, orderly
altruistic, caring, thoughtful, polite, courteous, gracious, kind, compassionate, empathic, sympathetic,
understanding, tolerant, non-judgmental, affable, friendly, gentle
creative, spontaneous, in touch with feelings, natural, genuine, open, sincere,
unique, being oneself, authenticity, proud, self-confident, independent, self-assertive,
self-aware, unpretentious, down-to-earth
respectful, obedient, law-abiding, cooperative, modest, humble
ambitious, energetic, serious, driven, hard-working, tough, inner strength, self-assertive, brave, willing to take risks
optimistic, looking on the bright side, cheerful, sense of humor
sensual, enjoys life, loves nature, cares for the planet, capable of great intimacy and deep friendship,
appreciates art and music, savoir faire, self-actualized, devoted to self-fulfillment
pure, calm, self-possessed, chaste, unmaterialistic, otherworldly
integrity, intellectual honesty, rational autonomy, willingness to question, truth-seeking
wise, experienced, thoughtful, intelligent, prudent, cautious, careful, broad knowledge
balanced, moderate, sober
This list, limited to a small selection of what can easily be expressed in the vocabulary of standard English, is already pretty long. It would certainly expand greatly if we included the virtue-vocabularies available in many other languages. It includes many ideas that were not familiar to people in Medieval Europe, and people in the future may discover ways of being an admirable person as yet unknown to us.
Reflection on the virtue-words in the Greek language that Plato uses in his discussions of virtue reinforce this point that virtue-concepts in different cultures are really different from each other. This makes it difficult to translate from one language to another in a word-for-word fashion.
“Beauty” in English normally refers to visual beauty. Kalos, Plato’s equivalent, refers not only to “beautiful” character, but most remarkably to “beautiful” laws and institutions. Translators often feel compelled to translate kalos as “noble,” “fine,” or “refined.”
“Piety” in English is normally used only in religious contexts. Eusebeia, Plato’s equivalent, refers both to one’s attitude to divine beings and to one’s parents.
“Courage” in English has no reference to male/female differences. Andreia, Plato’s equivalent, means literally “manliness.”
The Greek word sophrosyne is commonly recognized as one of the most difficult of Plato’s virtue-words to translate into English. Latin authors translated it by temperantia, which eventually became “temperance” in English. But “temperance” and sophrosyne have completely different connotations.
Appendix 2: Socrates as Midwife
(Excerpts from Plato’s Theaetetus)
These passages are important because they show that Socratic reasoning should not be an argument between two people, each arguing his or her own side. Even when it is done in conversation between two people, it must be an examination of a single person’s ideas and perceptions – the other conversation partner must just help this single person articulate and critically examine his or her own ideas and perceptions. This means also that it is possible for one person to engage in this kind of discussion by herself, as a kind of self-critical self-exploration.
Excerpts from Plato’s Theatetus
[Theaetetus 167e]
Socrates: Do not conduct your questioning unfairly. Unfairness here consists in not observing the distinction between a debate and a conversation. A debate need not be taken seriously and one may trip up an opponent to the best of one’s power, but a conversation should be undertaken seriously. One should help out the other party, and bring home to him only those slips and fallacies that are due to himself or to his earlier instructors. If you follow this rule, your associates will lay the blame for their confusions and perplexities on themselves and not on you. They will like you and want your company. Embarrassed about themselves, they will turn to philosophy, hoping to escape from their former selves and become different men. But if, like so many, you take the opposite course, you will reach the opposite result. Instead of turning your companions to philosophy, you will make them hate the whole business.
[148e]
Theaetetus: I have often set my myself to study that problem… but I cannot persuade myself that I can give any satisfactory solution or that anyone has ever stated in my hearing the sort of answer you require. And yet I cannot get the question out of my mind.
Socrates: That is because your mind is not empty or barren. You are suffering the pains of childbirth…Have you never heard that I am the son of a midwife…and that I practice the same trade? It is not known that I possess this skill, so the ignorant world describes me in other terms: As an eccentric person who reduces people to hopeless perplexity…
The only difference [between my trade and that of midwives] is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is experiencing birth pangs. And the highest achievement of my art is the power to try by every test to decide whether the offspring of a young man’s thought is a false phantom or is something imbued with life and truth.
I am like the midwife, in that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom. The common reproach is true, that, though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me…Of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul. Those who frequent my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent, but, as we go further with our discussions, [some] make progress at a rate that seems surprising to others as well as to themselves, although it is clear that they have never learned anything from me. The many admirable truths which they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within…
The proof of this is that many who have not been conscious of my assistance but have made light of me, thinking it was all their own doing, have left me sooner than they should…and then suffered miscarriage of their thoughts through falling into bad company. They lost the children of whom I had delivered them by bringing them up badly, caring more for false phantoms than for the true…
Those who seek my company have the same experience as a woman giving birth. They suffer labor pains and by night and day are full of distress. My art has power to bring on these pains or alleviate them.
…..
[Later in the discussion, Theaetetus 157c:]
Theaetetus: I cannot make out whether you are stating [some ideas] as something you believe, or merely testing me.
Socrates: You forget that I know nothing of such matters and cannot claim to be producing any offspring of my own. I am only trying to deliver yours, and to that end uttering charms over you and tempting your appetite with a variety of delicacies from the table of wisdom, until by my aid your own belief shall be brought to light. Once that is done, I shall see whether it proves to have some life in it or not. Meanwhile, have courage and patience, and answer my questions bravely in accordance with your convictions…
….
[Further still, Theaetetus 160e]
Socrates: [Speaking of a conclusion Theaetetus has come to] May we say that this is your newborn child?…Here at last, after our somewhat painful labor, is the child we have brought to birth…We must now look at our offspring from every angle to make sure we are not taken in by a lifeless phantom…Can you bear to see him tested, and not be in a passion if your first-born shall be taken away?
Theodorus [the teacher of Theaetetus]:
Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, he is thoroughly good tempered. But do explain what is wrong with the conclusion.
Socrates:
You take me for a sort of bag full of arguments, and imagine I can easily pull out a proof to show that our conclusion is wrong. You don’t see what’s happening. The arguments never come out of me; they always come out of the person I am talking with. I am only at a slight advantage in having the skill to get some account of the matter from another’s wisdom and think of it with fairness. So I shall not give any explanation myself, but try to get it out of our friend.
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